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Article 3

CONTEMPT AND EXECUTIVE POWER

TO PARDON
By

PAUL BUTLER

A great deal of attention has been given by the press in this
country during the past two years to the prolonged fight of Edward S. Shumaker, superintendent of the Anti-Saloon League of
Indiana, to escape the 60 day sentence to the Indiana State Farm
imposed upon him for his indirect contempt of the Supreme Court
-of Indiana. But, notwithstanding the publicity given the case,
there has been little discussion of the law involved and of the
questions raised in the successive and futile efforts to evade the
punishment.
At the outset, a brief rec.ital of the facts will lend comprehension to a now meager understanding of the subsequent proceedings. The verified information, as originally filed and subsequently amended by the Attorney General of Indiana, alleged
that Shumaker, as superintendent and directing head of the
league's activities in the state, was guilty of an indirect contempt
of the Supreme Court in having "prepared, printed, published,
circulated, and distributed" throughout the state a pamphlet,
containing "misleading, false and defamatory statements of and
concerning the Supreme Court, its judges and decisions in respect to violations of the liquor laws of the state". The pamphlet, later reprinted in the league's official organ-"The American Issue"--purported to be the annual report of the state superintendent.
Excerpts from the article, upon which the alleged contempt
is based, are as follows:
The Supreme Court of Indiana has "held that a defective search warrant should operate to let a guilty person
go free .................
"This court in the Callender case from Elkhart, and
more particularly in the Flum case from Beach Grove in
Marion County, and these reinforced by a number of later
decisions, has held that no matter how guilty a person may
be of violating the prohibition law, even though he might
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have as many as three stills in his home and be engaged in
manufacturing a white mule that is poisonous and deadly
in its effects, should there be any mistake in the search
warrant, such a person must be turned free. We think
that such rulings, coupled with the splitting of judicial
hairs in many cases coming before our Supreme Court
whereby substantial justice has been defeated repeatedly,
has been to a great degree responsible for the great increase in the appeals of criminal cases to our state's highest judiciary.
"One of its (the Supreme Court of Indiana) members
is said to be bitterly hostile to prohibition, and, if he had
it in his own power, would wipe all prohibition laws from
the statutes.................
"We well remember how the late Colonel Eli F. Ritter,
pioneer attorney for the tcmlperance forces in Indiana. used
to say to us that when the liquor interests could no longer
control the legislative or executive branches of our government they would then turn their attention to our courts
and seek to control them. I think there is no doubt that
this is true today in a bigger sense than ever before, and
that the law-abiding people of our state will have to strive
for the nomination and election of judges of such high
"judicial equipment and such a sense of honor and loyalty
to the Constitution and the laws enacted thereunder that
they will give judicial decisions carrying out in full and
effective manner both the letter and the spirit of our Constitution and laws enacted thereunder.
"If the entire state can be thus .aroused between this
and the time of the primaries, we hope to be able then after
the election in November to present again a solid dry delegation both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives, from Indiana .--------- And we trust that the next
election will give us a Supreme Court that will be dry and
not wet."
In a complete and exhaustive opinion,' written by justice
Myers and concurred in by Chief Justice Travis and Justice
Willoughby, the Supreme court held the respondent Shumaker
i State v. Shumaker, 157 IN. E. 769.
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guilty of an indirect contempt, on the theory that "any act, conduct or directing agency pertaining to pending proceedings 'intending to play on human frailty, and to deflect and deter the
court from the performance of it's duty, and to drive it into a
compromise with its own unfettered judgment, by placing it,
through the medium of knowingly false assertion, in a wrong
position before a public which has little opportunity to investigate the facts and ascertain .the'truth', regardless of results, 'clearly
constitutes "an obstruction to the administration of justice",' and
is contemptuous and within the inherent power of the court to
punish". The court held that the preparation, printing, publication, circulation and distribution of the pamphlets containing the
"report" constituted such conduct, and thereupon fined the adjudged contemner and sentenced him to serve 60 days at the
Indiana State Farm.
After exhausting every effort to escape the judgment of the
court, Shumaker finally, after more than eighteen months, submitted to imprisonment. At the moment of his entrance, however, the contemner received a pardon from Governor Ed Jackson, and once again the league superintendent was free. But it
was not long before the attorney general set in motion proceedings before the Supreme Court to recommit the prisoner, notwithstanding the governor's pardon.
Thereafter the Supreme Court recommitted Shumaker to
the state farm for the sixty day imprisonment,2 and upon application to the United States District court a writ of habeas corpus
issued. On final hearing, however, the temporary order was vacated and the defendant was remanded to the custody of the
sheriff of the State Supreme Court. The United States District
court based its decision not only on the proposition that it had no
right to interfere with the action of'a state supreme court in the
proceedings of a citation for contempt, but also upon the theory
that the pardon of a state governor to a contemner could be invalidated by that state's supreme court. After contemplating an
appeal to the United States Supreme court, and deciding against
it, Shumaker submitted to imprisonment.
Blackstone says8 that contempts may be committed "by
speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges acting
2 State v. Shumaker, 164 N. E. 408.
3 4 Cooley, Blackstone Comm. 285.
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in their judicial capacity,-------- and by anything, in short,
that demonstrates a gross want of that regard and respect which,
once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority is entirely
lost among the people."
The power of a court to punish for a contempt of its authority or its dignity is. a necessary adjunct to the exercise of the
powers conferred upon it.4 Such a power is, and has been, exercised upon the theory that it becomes the duty of the court, where
contemptuous acts have been committed so as to interfere with
its "orderly administration of justice," or to degrade the dignity
of the court and the majesty of the law, "to assess proper and
adequate punishment to the end that the court may maintain its
standing, dignity, and unrestrained enforcement of its lawful
powers in an orderly manner." 5
Contempt is usually classified as direct or indirect, and civil
or criminal.
Direct Contempt is "an open insult committed in the presence of the court to the person of the presiding judge, or a resistance or defiance in his presence to its powers or authority, or improper conduct so near .to the court as to interrupt its proceed6
ings."
Indirect Contempt, or a constructive contempt, is "an act
done, not in the presence of the court, but at a distance, which
tends to belittle, to degrade, or to obstruct, interrupt, prevent or
embarrass the administration of justice."7
Civil Contempt is the failure "to do something ordered to be
done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing
party therein, and is, therefore, not an offense against the dignity
of the court, but against the party in whose behalf the violated
order is made." s
Criminal Contempt is "conduct that is directed against the
dignity and authority of the court," either in criminal or civil
actions or special proceedings, or "an act committed against the
4 In re Yates (1809) 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 317; United States-v. Hudson, (1812)
11 U. S. 32; State v. Tipton, (1822) 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 166; Clark v. People,
(1830) 12 Am. Dec. (I1.) 177; Holcomb v. Cornish, (1831) 8 Conn. 379.
s State v. Shumaker, 157 N. E. 769-774.
6 13 Corpus Juris 5; Dodge v. State, 140 Ind. 284; Stewart v. State, 140
Ind. 7.
7 13 Corpus Juris 5; Ex parte Wright, 65 Ind. 504; Whittem v. State, 36
Ind. 196.
8 13 Corpus Juris 6; Rooker v. Brucee 171 Ind. 86.
9 13 Corpus Juris 6; In re Kahn, 204 Fed. 581.
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court as "an agency of the government", which may "consist in
'speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges acting in their judicial capacity'.1O
It follows from the definitions cited, that the particular act
involved in the Shumaker case is to be classified as an indirect or
constructive criminal contempt, if it is to be concluded, as it was
by ihe Supreme Court, that such an act constituted a contempt.
There have been numerous decisions in practically every
jurisdiction in which these fundamental principles of the law of
contempt have been adopted and approved. The question of executive power to pardon a contemner, who has been adjudged
guilty of contempt of court, however, is not a common one and
presents an interesting question to the students of political
science,--particularly to those who take an especial interest in
the problem of interference with, or restriction placed upon, the
action of one governmental branch by another. Has the executive branch of national or state government the power and authority to interfere with the action of the judicial branch in the
preservation of its authority and dignity by the pardon of a contemner of a certain court of the judicial department?
(To be continued.)

io In re Fite, 76 S.

. (Ga.)
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